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1. Introduction 
 
In his famous Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), Robert Nozick discusses the notion of 
“utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people” (Nozick, 1974: 39). This notion implies 
that human beings, but not animals, should be seen as constituting so-called ‘ends-in-
themselves’. Therefore, human beings, but not animals, should be granted certain inviolable 
moral rights. I shall call this tendency to apply Kantianism to humans while refusing to do so 
in the case of animals asymmetrical Kantianism. By limiting Kantianism to human beings, we 
effectively demote animals to the status of mere means to (non)human ends and pave the way 
for the justification of unwarranted practices of animal exploitation.  
 In this thesis I shall attempt to show that the asymmetrical Kantian view is morally 
untenable. I will argue against its underlying idea that the possession of personhood is a 
necessary requirement for having moral rights. I will do so by showing that the possession of 
what I will call selfhood (which entails the idea of being a subject of a life (i.e. a being who 
matters to- and in itself)) should be considered a necessary and sufficient requirement for 
having moral rights. I will show that at least mammals and birds possess the characteristics 
that are necessary for the possession of selfhood; namely consciousness, sentience and the 
capacity to form beliefs and desires. Animal selves share these characteristics with human 
selves (indeed, I will argue that the difference between human beings and animals is a matter 
of degree, and not of kind). Once we accept the moral relevance of selfhood, and 
acknowledge that it should lead to the treatment of selves as ends-in-themselves (as I will 
show we should), it becomes clear that we have no good reason not to extend inviolable 
Kantian rights to the above mentioned animals.  
 In what follows I will first show why utilitarianism cannot be seen as providing 
sufficient protection to the interests of animals and how Kantianism potentially offers a 
solution to this problem. Then I will continue by showing why animals cannot be seen as 
persons and how this fact has been used to justify asymmetrical Kantianism. I will then go on 
to show that some animals possess selfhood, and that this should lead to them having moral 
rights. Then I will argue that those proponents of asymmetrical Kantianism who claim that the 
possession of personhood is not a sufficient requirement for having moral rights because 
moral right holders must necessarily also be members of the human species, are wrong. I will 
finish by concluding that seeing how animal selves should be granted certain inviolable moral 
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rights, asymmetrical Kantianism must be abandoned, which would necessarily result in a 
radical shift in our current treatment of animals. 
 
2. Asymmetrical Kantianism 
 
In this thesis I will attempt to make the case against asymmetrical Kantianism. By 
asymmetrical Kantianism I mean that strand of philosophical thought in which it is thought 
that considerations concerning nonhuman animals (which from now on will be called 
‘animals’) in moral questions should be guided by ‘utilitarian’ principles, while 
considerations concerning human animals (which from now on will be called ‘humans’) in 
moral questions should be guided by ‘Kantian’ principles. Simply put, asymmetrical 
Kantianism entails the advocacy of ‘utilitarianism for animals and Kantianism for people’ 
(Nozick, 1974: 39), which is based on two ideas, namely that 1.) the total happiness of all 
living beings should be maximized, and 2.) human beings, but not animals, enjoy a protected 
status and may not be sacrificed in order to bring about this maximization of total happiness. 
The rejection of asymmetrical Kantianism that I shall bring to the fore in this essay 
will be based on two distinct claims: 1. Asymmetrical Kantianism should be considered a 
morally inconsistent notion which can only be remedied by either extending utilitarianism to 
humans or extending Kantianism to animals. 2. Kantianism is to be preferred over 
utilitarianism (because only Kantianism can sufficiently protect individuals by granting them 
so-called ‘inviolable rights’); remedying asymmetrical Kantianism should therefore entail the 
extension of Kantianism to animals rather than the extension of utilitarianism to humans.  
 The first claim will be discussed at length in pages to come. But before we get to this 
discussion, it is to the second claim that I would like to turn. In order to fully comprehend the 
notion of asymmetrical Kantianism and its implications, both utilitarianism and Kantianism 
must be addressed. Only after we have discussed these philosophical theories can we really 
grasp the impact that an asymmetrical Kantian approach will have on our treatment of 
animals.   
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2.1 Utilitarianism 
 
Utilitarian ideas are strongly represented in the animal rights debate. Indeed, some of the 
earliest and most important works on animal welfare are utilitarian in nature. Utilitarian 
thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer have brought to the fore important 
considerations and insights regarding animals, including their entitlement to moral standing. 
These insights have forced us to consider the interests of animals in moral deliberations, and 
should be regarded as significant contributions to the animal rights debate. However, even 
though utilitarians may claim that their theory provides a satisfactory solution to our structural 
exploitation of animals (if this were true, the notion of ‘utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism 
for people’ would perhaps have less problematic consequences for animal welfare), I will 
claim otherwise, namely that the application of utilitarian principles to moral questions 
involving animals will lead to the structural violation of animals’ interests, and that successful 
advocacy of animal rights must therefore necessarily be based on an extended Kantian 
approach. Let us now turn to why this is so.  
 
2.1.1 Utilitarianism and Moral Rights 
As we will see below, to have moral standing in utilitarian terms is to have the ‘right to equal 
consideration of one’s interests’. Before we continue, it must be made clear what is meant by 
‘rights’ in the utilitarian sense. Utilitarians state that moral rights should not be conceived of 
as preexisting, ‘natural rights’. As Bentham notoriously stated, utilitarians consider “natural 
rights” to be “nonsense” and “natural and imprescriptible rights” to be “nonsense upon stilts.” 
(Singer, 2009: 8). ‘Moral rights’, then, are really “those protections that people and animals 
morally ought to have” (Singer, 2009: 8); ‘and nothing more’.  
I partly accept this view. As will be discussed in later sections, morality is a ‘manmade 
product’. Unless one is prepared to view morality and moral rights as divine creations (which 
I am not), one has no choice but to succumb to the idea that it was humans who, through 
reason, formed these notions. Therefore, Bentham’s statement that moral rights cannot not be 
seen as natural rights seems little controversial and should indeed be adopted. Naturally, if 
one refutes the idea of there being natural rights, one must also reject the idea that there are 
natural and imprescriptible rights. When I say that I agree with Bentham on these questions, 
this is not to say that I think that there are no imprescriptible moral rights. And neither does 
Bentham, for he adheres to at least one inviolable right, namely the abovementioned  right to 
the equal consideration of individuals’ like interests. Violating this right would be morally 
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wrong. But, as we will see shortly, granting this one particular right does not sufficiently 
protect animal interests, and yet is as far as utilitarians are willing to go.  
 
2.1.2 Hedonistic Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism in all its forms is concerned with maximizing utility. Morally desirable actions 
are therefore those actions that bring about an end state in which maximal utility is achieved. 
Utilitarianism is thus consequentialist in nature, meaning that it is (generally) concerned with 
the outcomes of certain actions, rather than with the actions themselves. Within utilitarianism 
however, disagreement exists about which outcomes should be seen as preferable, or put 
differently, what constitutes utility. In the hedonistic (or classical) account of utilitarianism, as 
propagated by the likes of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, pleasure is considered to be 
inherently good and suffering to be inherently bad. Maximal utility is therefore achieved 
when, on aggregate, pleasure is maximized and suffering is minimized. The paramount 
importance of achieving the optimal balance of pleasure over pain is illustrative for the 
aggregative nature of hedonistic (and all other strands of) utilitarianism.  
 But what (or better yet: who) does ‘the aggregate’ consist of? In other words, who 
should be included in the utilitarian calculus? Bentham has famously stated that within 
utilitarianism “each (is) to count for one and none for more than one” (Singer, 2009: 5). From 
this idea, the principle of equal consideration of like interests is derived. This principle entails 
the above mentioned idea that “the interests of every being affected by an action are to be 
taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being.” 
(Singer, 2009: 5). According to hedonistic utilitarianism, the most important and morally 
relevant interest of individuals is their interest in avoiding pain and increasing pleasure. If we 
assume that animals are sentient beings (I will address this issue in more detail later), with the 
ability to experience pleasure and pain in similar ways as humans do, it follows from the 
principle of equal consideration of like interests that we should include animals in our 
utilitarian calculations, effectively incorporating them in our moral community. It is on the 
basis of this reasoning that Bentham famously concluded that in our deliberations on the 
moral standing of animals “the question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can 
they suffer?” (Singer, 2009: 7).  
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2.1.3 Preference Utilitarianism 
In his Animal Liberation (1975; 2009) and Practical Ethics (1993), Peter Singer builds on, 
and modifies, Bentham’s hedonistic theory. Singer’s account of utilitarianism, which can be 
called preference utilitarianism, entails the idea that “actions are to be judged by the extent to 
which they accord with the preferences of any beings affected by the action or its 
consequences.” (Singer, 1993: 94). From this it follows that “an action contrary to the 
preferences of any being is, unless outweighed by contrary preferences, wrong.” (Singer, 
1993: 94). Singer agrees with Bentham’s notion that “sentience is the only defensible 
boundary of concern for the interests of others.” (2009: 8-9). The most important preferences 
in Singer’s theory are therefore those that involve avoiding suffering and maximizing 
pleasure. Seeing how these preferences are similar for both humans and animals, they should 
carry equal weight in the utilitarian calculus.  
To exclude animals from our moral community would constitute what Singer calls 
speciesism. Speciesism can be defined as “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the 
interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of other species.” 
(Singer, 2009: 6). If a cross-species preference for avoiding suffering and maximizing 
pleasure is a sufficient characteristic for inclusion in the utilitarian calculus, then it would be 
arbitrary to exclude beings from this calculus on the basis of their species membership, just 
like it would be arbitrary to exclude beings on the basis of their race, age, intelligence, or any 
other trivial characteristic.  
Singer’s preference utilitarianism leads him to condemn those practices that involve 
the maltreatment of animals, such as raising them for slaughter and using them in medical or 
cosmetic experiments. He claims that ‘trivial’ preferences of human beings, such as the 
consumption of meat and the wearing of make-up, cannot outweigh the preferences of 
animals in avoiding suffering and maximizing pleasure. In other words, because the 
preferences of human beings in these cases should be seen as dubious, the harm inflicted on 
animals must be perceived as causing ‘unnecessary suffering’, and therefore as being morally 
wrong. Singer states that by changing our attitudes towards the treatment of animals 
concerning the abovementioned practices “the total quantity of suffering would be greatly 
reduced; so greatly that it is hard to imagine any other change of moral attitude that would 
cause so great a reduction in the total sum of suffering in the universe.” (Singer, 1993: 61).  
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2.1.4 Difficulties With the Utilitarian View 
Both hedonistic and preference utilitarianism should clearly be credited with rationalizing and 
highlighting the importance of animal interests in moral deliberations. However, both 
utilitarian accounts are subject to structural problems that thwart their ability to sufficiently 
protect animal interests.  
 
The Utilitarian Bias 
It is important to realize that while utilitarianism is highly egalitarian in the sense that it 
propagates equal consideration of the like interests of individuals, it does not guarantee equal 
treatment of those individuals. If one’s interests are outweighed by the like interests of others, 
one’s interests will be ‘sacrificed’ in order to bring about maximal utility.  
This fact may have problematic consequences for both humans and animals. Indeed, 
the principle of equal consideration of interests cannot prevent the things it was designed to 
eradicate, such as racism and speciesism. After all, nothing is to prevent the aggregate of 
interests (in other words the outcome of the utilitarian calculus) from being biased towards a 
particular group. For example, if a particular group constitutes the majority within a given 
society, the equal consideration of each individual’s pleasure and pain is likely to result in a 
course of action that increases this majority’s pleasure (assuming that this majority has 
homogenous sources of pleasure). At the very least, such a bias will result in the structural 
ignorance of the pleasures of minority groups (assuming that the minority’s pleasures deviate 
from those of the majority). In the worst case, it will result in the structural violation of these 
minority groups' interests, which may include harming them in some way (assuming that, on 
the aggregate, the majority’s gained pleasures outweigh the minority’s pains).  
Preference utilitarianism faces similar problems. Most importantly, it fails to account 
for (a bias towards) so-called evil preferences. As mentioned above, Singer claims that 
‘trivial’ preferences are to count for less in the utilitarian calculus, but it is unclear why this 
should be the case. When Singer speaks of ‘trivial interests’ he transfers value onto the 
purpose of a certain action (for example: the purpose of holding cattle in order to fuel the 
meat industry). However, as Regan (2004: 221) rightfully states, preference utilitarians have 
no reason to care about the purpose of an action, as long as it results in a maximization of 
satisfied preferences (whether these preferences are trivial or not).  
To illustrate: imagine a group of five teenagers, throwing firecrackers at an old lady in 
the park. According to preference utilitarianism, the preferences of these six individuals 
should all be counted equally. Let’s assume that the old lady suffers severely from the 
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firecrackers being thrown at her. Let’s say that the teenagers’ behavior has caused her 
preference for going on a stroll through the park to drop from 10 to 1. Now let’s assume that 
each of the five teenagers takes mild pleasure in throwing firecrackers at this poor lady. Let’s 
say that such behavior causes each teenager’s preference for hanging out in the park to be 
elevated from 1 to 3. The utilitarian calculus would lead us to conclude that on the aggregate, 
the sum of preference satisfaction will be higher when the teenagers get to throw their 
firecrackers at the old lady (5*3+1=16) than when they do not (5*1+10=15). The fact that the 
teenagers’ preferences may be conceived as ‘evil’ does not change the moral relevance of the 
outcome of the utilitarian calculus. All that matters for this calculus to be morally valid is that 
the individuals involved have an interest in satisfying their preferences. The nature of these 
preferences is irrelevant. In other words, evil preferences are in fact morally neutral from a 
preference utilitarian point of view. 
The problem of arbitrary preferences is further exemplified in Will Kymlicka’s 
account of so-called external preferences (2002: 38). External preferences stand in contrast to 
personal preferences (the things that one wishes for oneself) and can be defined as those 
preferences that concern the things that one wishes for others. External preferences can be 
‘evil’ too. For example, if, for some reason, one has a preference for a certain group’s 
deprivation of food, utilitarianism obliges us to take this preference into consideration and, if 
this preference is shared by a majority within society, see to it that it is acted upon.  
 
Animals as Human Property 
The above mentioned utilitarian bias is particularly persistent when it involves the treatment 
of animals. Indeed, if on aggregate, preferences for the maltreatment of animals outweigh the 
preferences of animals not to be maltreated, the maltreatment becomes morally justified (and 
indeed, required). Put differently, “preference utilitarianism does not preclude the exploitation 
of animals since we can always override the animal’s interest in not suffering in the name of 
even trivial human interests, so long as preferences are maximized when all is said and done.” 
(Abbate, 2014: 915). Singer’s attempt to provide a utilitarian reason for the abolition of 
animal-unfriendly industries is thus on shaky ground.  
 Let’s take the cosmetic industry as an example. If we were to decide on whether or 
not to abolish cosmetic experimentation on animals, Singer argues that the aggregate interests 
in not suffering of the animals involved may outweigh the interests of teenage girls in wearing 
make-up. However, even if we were to accept this claim (and it seems unclear why we should, 
for it is very difficult to establish its accuracy through calculation), the utilitarian calculus 
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would have to include the side-effects of such an abolition as well. Such side-effects may 
include the loss of jobs for those who work in the cosmetics industry, the resulting decrease in 
the quality of life for them and their families, etcetera. If all these preferences and side-effects 
are taken into consideration, the continuance of cosmetic experimentation on animals may 
seem morally justified.  
Gary Francione (2007) has offered an interesting insight as to why human preferences 
will always have the upper hand in the utilitarian calculus. He notes that by viewing animals 
as commodities, the notion of necessary suffering becomes “any suffering needed to use our 
animal property for a particular purpose – even if that purpose is our mere convenience or 
pleasure.” (Francione, 2007: XXV). Therefore, as long as humans consider animals to be their 
property, the structural violation of animal interests seems to be unavoidable.  
 
Killing individuals 
Another major problem that utilitarians have to face is the fact that it justifies the killing of 
individuals. After all, according to utilitarian theory, harming or killing an individual appears 
to be completely justifiable if this somehow increases pleasure on the aggregate. Moreover, if 
the amount of pleasure that is lost by killing one individual is compensated for by bringing 
into life a new individual that has the capacity of experiencing more pleasure than the 
‘sacrificed’ individual, then this would appear to be the morally right thing to do. 
 Hedonistic utilitarians have attempted to avoid having to justify the killing of 
individuals by claiming that a violent death may cause severe suffering in the victim, which 
would offset the utilitarian balance and tip the scales in the individual’s favor. They have also 
claimed that there are important side-effects to killing innocent individuals, such as the fear 
(of being sacrificed) that such behavior would induce in other individuals, and the grieve it 
would cause to those people that had close relationships with the victim. However, we may 
assume that such side-effects do not apply in the case of animals, for the killing of their fellow 
animals may have a moderate impact on them due to their likely inability to make proper 
sense of such events. And even in the case of humans, the hedonistic utilitarian arguments 
against killing individuals do not prove to be sufficient. For what if we were to kill a family- 
and friendless individual, unannounced, in secret, and in a quick and painless way? A 
hedonistic utilitarian would have to find such a killing justified, as long as it leads to an 
overall increase in utility. This conclusion sits uneasy with common intuition. 
 Preference utilitarianism has claimed to provide a sufficient answer to the problem of 
killing individuals in order to bring about maximal utility. Singer states that rational, self-
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conscious beings, with a perception of themselves as an entity that exists through time, have a 
preference in staying alive and that this preference morally obliges us to refrain from killing 
such beings (Singer, 1993: 90). However, this supposed solution is not at all satisfying. First, 
as Singer (1993: 95) willingly acknowledges, it does not provide the slightest bit of protection 
for animals. Seeing how animals are not likely to be rational individuals with a clear 
perception of their own mortality, killing them painlessly (in order to increase the overall 
balance of pleasure over pain) would be morally justifiable (slaughtering animals for their 
meat, then, would be morally acceptable). Second, it is not at all clear why an individual’s 
preference for staying alive should result in our obligation to refrain from killing this 
individual. If killing this individual brings about the best overall consequences (if, all things 
considered, the aggregated preferences of other individuals outweigh the violation of this 
individual’s interest in staying alive), it seems unclear why preference utilitarianism should 
lead us to refrain from doing so. 
  
The Receptacle Problem 
The above mentioned problems with the utilitarian view can all be lead back to one essential 
feature of utilitarianism; namely its treatment of individuals as mere ‘receptacles’ of utility. 
As Regan has pointed out, utilitarian logic leads to the view that individuals “have no value of 
their own; what has value is what they contain.” (2004: 205). This leads utilitarians to justify 
treating these individuals as nothing more than means to and end (maximum utility). I will 
refer to this problem as the receptacle problem.  
 
2.2 Kantianism  
 
2.2.1 Solving the Receptacle Problem 
Kantianism can be seen as providing a satisfactory solution to utilitarianism’s receptacle 
problem. Rather than ascribing to consequentialist ideals, Kantianism entails a so-called 
deontological approach to ethical deliberations. Where consequentialists stress the paramount 
importance of the outcomes of certain moral actions, deontologists adhere to the idea that 
there are certain inviolable moral rights that must be respected at all times, regardless of the 
consequences of doing so.  
 Moral rights, in the Kantian sense, and in the sense that I will use throughout the 
remainder of this thesis, can be defined as “claim(s) to something and against someone, the 
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recognition of which is called for by (…) the principles of an enlightened conscience.” 
(Feinberg, 2012: 372). This implies that we have direct duties towards moral rights holders, 
the most important of which is the duty to respond to their valid claims (although, as I will 
show, the ability to make such claims is should not be a prerequisite for having moral rights). 
Kantian moral rights should be seen as inviolable rights. The notion of inviolability is in 
direct concurrence with Kantianism’s deontological approach. It entails the idea that one’s 
basic interests can never be violated in order to bring about desired consequences. 
 According to Kant, persons derive their right to inviolable right from their ability to 
function as rational beings and their capability of forming moral legislation and acting on 
moral principles. Moral rights are thus seen as the product of persons’ moral deliberations. 
Viewed in this light, there seems to be little divergence between the Kantian take on rights 
and the utilitarian claim that moral rights should not be seen as preexisting, divine, or natural 
rights, but rather as manmade ‘protections that people and animals morally ought to have’ 
(see above). The main divergence between Kantian and utilitarian moral rights then, concerns 
the content of such rights. 
The most important Kantian moral right is the right of individuals to be treated as so-
called ‘ends-in-themselves’. This idea is clearly expressed in Kant’s famous formula of 
humanity as end in itself: “So act that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” 
(Wood, 1998: 5-6). This notion clearly forms a radical deviation from utilitarian thinking in 
which, as we have seen, individuals may at all times be used ‘merely as a means’ as long as 
doing so results in the maximization of overall utility. 
Where the utilitarian principle of equal consideration of like interests does not ensure 
equal treatment of individuals, Kantian theory does ensure equal treatment. In Kantianism, 
every person has the same basic moral right to be treated as an end in him- or herself. To be 
treated as an end-in-oneself, means that others are prohibited from violating one’s autonomy. 
The negative duties that arise from treating individuals as ends-in-themselves, include the 
duty not to harm and the duty not to kill them. 
 
2.2.2. Kantianism and Animals 
It must be made clear that in Kantian theory, animals are not considered to have moral rights. 
Seeing how moral rights are derived from individuals’ possession of personhood, and, as I 
will show below, animals cannot be seen as possessing personhood, they are to be excluded 
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from the moral community. According to Kant then, “animals are not self-conscious and are 
there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.” (2012: 359).  
 But while we may not have direct duties towards animals, Kant argues that we are 
nonetheless obliged to treat them with respect and not treat them cruelly. However, Kant sees 
these obligations as duties to our own humanity. He argues that inflicting unnecessary 
suffering on animals could lead us to transcend such behavior to fellow humans. This view is 
also expressed by Peter Carruthers, who states that: “a cruel action (towards animals) is wrong 
because it evinces a cruel character. (…) What makes a cruel character bad is that it is likely 
to express itself in cruelty towards people, which would involve direct violations of the rights 
of those who are caused to suffer.” (1992: 15).  
The Kantian refusal to acknowledge our direct duties towards animals, goes directly 
against the animal rights position that I will come to defend in this thesis. Therefore it is 
important to note that when I speak of ‘Kantianism for animals’ or ‘extended Kantianism’, I 
am speaking of an application of those Kantian principles that until now have been reserved 
for persons, to animals;  not of the traditional Kantian view on (the absence of) animal rights. 
In other words, when I am speaking of Kantianism for animals, I am speaking of animals’ 
rights not to be treated as a mere means.  
 
2.3 The Implications of Asymmetrical Kantianism 
 
As mentioned at the start of this section, asymmetrical Kantianism entails the idea of 
‘utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people’. Now that we have a better conception of 
both utilitarianism and Kantianism, the implications of asymmetrical Kantianism (particularly 
those that relate to the treatment of animals) become clearer. Its most important implication is 
that animals are to be seen as “freely violable in the service of the greater good”, whereas 
humans are “fully inviolable” (McMahan, 2002: 265). 
 I have shown that utilitarianism cannot prevent the structural violation of animals’ 
interests/preferences for not suffering, even if these interests/preferences are considered 
equally with the interests/preferences of humans. As Cheryl Abbate (2014: 909) puts it, 
utilitarianism is ‘overly permissive’; it allows for the violation of animal’s integrity for the 
sake of human prosperity. In principle then, ‘utilitarianism for animals, utilitarianism for 
people’, would already cause animals to be at the losing end of any moral outcome. 
Asymmetrical Kantianism only exacerbates the structural neglect of animals interests. After 
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all, it protects humans from being treated as mere (replaceable) receptacles, while refusing to 
do the same for animals, effectively turning animals into disposable means to human (and 
nonhuman) ends.   
 I will argue that granting humans inviolable rights (most importantly the right to be 
treated as an end-in-oneself), while neglecting to do so in the case of animals, is morally 
inconsistent. I will show that an extension of Kantianism to animals (which remains a 
controversial idea) is not only justified, but morally required. My argument can be 
summarized as follows: 1.) Kantianism is preferable over utilitarianism, because, unlike 
utilitarianism, it grants individuals the moral right to be treated as ends-in-themselves; 2.) this 
moral right must be granted to all beings that ‘matter to themselves’; 3.) (at least) some 
animals are selves who matter to themselves; 4.) therefore Kantianism should be extended to 
(at least) some animals.  
The remainder of these pages will revolve around the task of setting forth this 
argument. In order to successfully refute Kantianism, its underlying views must first be laid 
bare and then disposed with. The most crucial assumption that proponents of asymmetrical 
Kantianism make is that the possession of personhood is necessary for receiving the moral 
right to be treated as an end-in-itself; a principle that has been hinted at in the 
abovementioned discussion of Kantianism and which I will now explore in more depth. 
 
3. Personhood 
 
Proponents of asymmetrical Kantianism often base their views on the assumption that animals 
lack personhood. Their refusal to grant inviolable moral rights to animals is inferred from this 
assumption in the following way: 
  
The Personhood Argument  
 
1. The possession of personhood is a necessary requirement for having inviolable moral 
rights. 
2. No animal possesses personhood. 
3. Therefore, no animal has inviolable moral rights.  
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It seems that the first and/or the second premise of the personhood argument needs to be 
refuted in order to successfully make the case against  asymmetrical Kantianism. I will now 
show that the second premise cannot successfully be shown to be false, and that a refutation  
of the personhood argument must therefore necessarily be based on a rejection of the first 
premise.  
 
3.1 Do Animals Possess Personhood? 
 
In order to determine whether animals can possibly possess personhood, it first needs to be 
made clear what personhood entails. Sapontzis (1981: 607) discerns two different conceptions 
of personhood. The first one, which he calls the moral conception of personhood, is 
evaluative in nature; it denotes a certain status; “To be a person is to be due certain honors 
and privileges from anyone whose actions might influence his well-being. A person is a being 
whose interests must be respected.” (Sapontzis, 1981: 609), in other words, persons are 
“beings to whom rights can be ascribed or who have moral standing independent from the 
interests of others.” (Cushing, 2003: 557). Some animal rights proponents adopt this 
conception of personhood and conclude that, seeing how (according to them) animals have 
certain moral rights, they must logically be persons (Cushing, 2013; Francione, 2007), after 
all, to have moral rights is to be a person.  
I will not adopt such a moral conception of personhood in this work. To do so would 
be to render the personhood argument true by definition, and therefore indisputable. Denying 
the first premise of the personhood argument, which I intend to do in the upcoming sections, 
would become a futile task, because the moral conception of personhood would render it 
axiomatic. After all, according to the moral conception of personhood, to be a person is to 
have moral rights and to have moral rights is to be a person. Trying to refute the first premise 
would be like trying to deny the statement that the having the body of a horse is a necessary 
requirement for being a horse. I will not accept the reciprocal relationship between 
personhood and moral rights which the moral conception of personhood implies. I certainly 
do not wish to doubt that all persons, because of their personhood, automatically have moral 
rights (I fully agree with this statement). Rather I wish to deny that to have moral standing is 
to be granted personhood. To clarify this statement, I will need to elaborate on what I 
understand personhood to be. Sapontzis’ second conception of personhood proves to be a 
good starting point for this endeavor.  
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Sapontzis’ second, metaphysical, conception of personhood is descriptive in nature 
and denotes a kind of thing. Persons are: “those thing which are (a) embodied; (b) animate; (c) 
emotive; (d) initiators of actions rather than reflexive (…) respondents to their environment; 
and (e) capable of forming ideas about the world rather than being merely things in the 
world.” (Sapontzis, 1981: 607-608). The conception of personhood that I will adopt, is a 
metaphysical conception in so far as it describes certain behavioral characteristics and 
intellectual capacities that all persons must possess. 
Personhood, as I understand it, aligns perfectly with what Regan calls moral agency: 
“Moral agents are individuals who have a variety of sophisticated abilities, including in 
particular the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, 
all considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this determination, to freely 
choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive it, requires.” (Regan, 2004: 151). 
Persons are those beings that are rational, capable of moral reflection, engaging in moral 
legislative processes, and acting upon moral principles. Henceforth, ‘personhood’/‘person’ 
will stand for this ‘moral agency interpretation’ of personhood.  
In everyday use, the metaphysical conception of personhood as moral agency is often 
equated with ‘humanity’. However, if we understand humanity in the sense of ‘belonging to 
the species Homo Sapiens’, the equation between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’ cannot readily be 
made. Species membership in itself cannot be a determining factor for the granting of 
personhood. As Cushing (2003: 559) shows, in a hypothetical situation in which some kind of 
extraterrestrial lifeform with levels of moral agency similar to ours settles on earth, we would 
find it morally arbitrary not to grant them personhood purely on the basis of their membership 
of a different species. Furthermore, as will be shown later, not all humans are in fact persons, 
which forms yet another reason why the blind equation of these two concepts is undesirable. 
If moral agency is a prerequisite for personhood, and may not a priori be ascribed only 
to the human species, our wish to scrutinize the second premise of the personhood argument 
seems justified; we must determine whether any animal can possibly be considered to be a 
moral agent and therefore a person. A common way of ascribing moral agency, and as 
outlined by Sapontzis (1987: 31) goes as follows: 
 
The Moral Agency Argument 
 
1. An action is moral only if the agent recognizes that it is the moral thing to do and does 
it because it is the moral thing to do.  
 17 
2. Only beings of ‘normal’ intelligence are capable of such recognition and motivation.  
3. Therefore, only beings of ‘normal’ intelligence can act morally. 
 
The soundness of the moral agency argument hinges on our acceptance of its first premise 
and/or its second premise. Its first premise concerns the conceptualization of morality as 
something that can only exist under the precondition of intentionality. I think this assertion is 
correct. Morality is not an objective, pre-existing phenomenon, and cannot exist outside the 
minds of rational beings. We consider an action to be moral because we attach a certain value 
to it. In order to act morally, we must therefore be able to decide upon this value through 
rational reflection, and ascribe enough importance to it to resort to action. Whenever a deed is 
not the result of some sort of scrutinizing process, we cannot speak intentionality, and 
therefore we cannot speak of moral behavior. For example: Maurice finds himself on top of a 
high building. While strolling across the edge of the rooftop, he accidentally trips over some 
rubbish. At the exact same time, a few feet away from Maurice, a small boy is about to plunge 
to his premature death as he loses his balance and starts to topple over the edge of the 
building. Maurice’s fall causes him to bump into the small boy, pushing him away from the 
edge, and thereby saving his life. Maurice’s fall can hardly be described as a moral action 
because it lack intentionality. Put differently, Maurice’s action was not the result of a 
deliberative process about the values of life and his duty to protect it. To illustrate: the 
sentence ‘saving a boy from his premature death’ has a moral connotation, the sentence 
‘accidentally saving a boy from his premature death’ does not. 
 In order to act intentionally, a certain level of intelligence or rationality is needed. 
After all, intentionality requires the ability to reflect on, and attach value to, behavior in 
particular situations. It cannot with certainty be stated that no animal possesses such levels of 
intelligence. Some species (such as the great apes and dolphins) are presumed to be highly 
intelligent and can therefore not readily be dismissed as potential moral agents. For example, 
studies into the behavior of chimpanzees and the social structures of their colonies, have 
shown that these animals display what could be considered moral behavior, including such 
things as the sharing of resources, and the carrying out of collective punitive actions. But 
although we might be reluctant to conclusively deny that animals such as the great apes 
possess the capacity for moral agency, the fact remains that for many other species such a 
conclusive denial may be justified (including most of the species that suffer the greatest from 
human exploitation). Biologically speaking, research into the brain-capacity of many species 
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of animal seems to disprove the contention that these animals indeed possess the intellectual 
capacity needed to engage in moral reflection.  
Nevertheless, some may argue that the actions of the dog that wakes up his owner in 
order to warn him that the house is on fire, should be seen as moral in nature. However, 
bearing in mind the limited brain-capacity of dogs, it remains unclear whether the actions of 
the dog are the result of the dog’s inner moral reflections, or of its natural instincts (such 
barking in the case of danger). In other words, we have good reasons to doubt that the dog 
should be considered a moral agent. Dogs are not able to recognize and be motivated by moral 
considerations. If the second premise of the moral agency argument is correct, then dogs (and 
many other animals) cannot act morally.  
 However, attempts have been made to deny that certain levels of intelligence are 
necessary in order to engage in moral behavior. Sapontzis (1987: 33), for example, claims that 
“an action can be instinctual (…), or conditioned (…), yet still be a response to moral goods.”. 
By stating this, he implies that a certain level of intelligence is not needed in order to have 
moral motivations (and act on them). As an example he names the maternal instincts of 
animals. He states that a wolf feeding its young does so out of regard to the actual needs of 
the young. In other words, the wolf acts unselfishly by sacrificing a meal that it may as well 
have eaten itself, in order to further the interests of the young. At least two things can be said 
against this reasoning. First, it remains to be seen whether maternal behavior should indeed be 
regarded as originating in a genuine concern for the interests of others. It may also possibly be 
conceived as behavior guided by self-interest; namely the interest in the health of one’s own 
young. Second, and more importantly, the wolf’s behavior in itself is not moral. As I have 
claimed above, morality is not an objective phenomenon that can exist outside the minds of 
beings. The wolf’s behavior is only moral because we, as moral agents attach value to it. At 
the same time, seeing how we are justified in assuming that the wolf does not possess 
sufficient levels of intelligence to engage in moral reflection, its behavior should be seen as 
morally neutral. It is important to keep making the distinction between the display of moral 
behavior and the intentional acting on moral considerations.  
 In sum, my conception of personhood is based on Regan’s notion of moral agency. I 
accept the moral agency argument, with the logical consequence that most animals (and some 
human beings) cannot be seen as moral agents. In the case of the abovementioned ‘higher 
animals’ such as chimpanzees, our reasons for denying them the capacity for moral agency 
are more questionable. Even when, in real world situations, I would argue in favor of giving 
such species the benefit of the doubt, I will, for the sake of clarity, hereby assume that they 
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are not moral agents. In other words, no animals are moral agents and thus no animals are 
persons (as we will see, this assumption will not weaken my eventual argument in favor of 
inviolable rights for animals).  
From this it follows that the second premise of the personhood argument must be 
accepted. A rejection of the personhood argument must thus necessarily be based on the 
refutation of its first premise, which holds that the possession of personhood is a necessary 
requirement for having inviolable moral rights. Now let’s see on which assumptions and 
beliefs this premise is based.  
 
3.2 Personhood as a Prerequisite for Having Inviolable Moral Rights 
 
The notion of personhood as a prerequisite for having inviolable moral rights implies that 
only those beings who possess moral agency can have the right to be treated as ends-in-
themselves. The idea that only moral agents are eligible for inviolable rights is persistent 
within the literature and can be traced back to the above mentioned Kantian tradition. 
According to Kant, only rational nature has absolute and unconditional value (Wood, 1998: 
3). Therefore, only those beings who possess rational nature (moral agents) can be seen as 
constituting ends-in-themselves. This idea is implied in Kant’s above mentioned formula of 
humanity as end in itself, in which humanity should be interpreted as a purely technical term 
that refers to rationality. But why is rational nature, and the moral agency that stems from it, 
so important for Kantians?  
 According to Kantian theory, “the authority of the moral law (is) grounded in the fact 
that it is legislated by rational will” (Wood, 1998: 1). To (over) simplify; morality can only be 
constructed by moral agents because only they are capable of “assessing and judging the 
principles that govern our beliefs and actions, and of regulating our beliefs and actions in 
accordance with those judgments.” (Korsgaard, 2004: 11). In other words, only moral agents 
are able to comprehend moral values and therefore, only moral agents can be subjects of 
morality. Related to this, is the notion that only moral agents can engage in reciprocal moral 
relationships. Kant calls the moral community that arises when rational beings engage in 
reciprocal moral relationships the ‘Kingdom of Ends’. The Kingdom of Ends, then, is 
comprised of rational beings who respect one another’s humanity (Korsgaard, 2004: 4). 
Because animals lack personhood, and thus rationality and moral agency, they cannot 
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comprehend moral values, nor engage in reciprocal moral relationships, and must therefore be 
excluded from our moral community.  
However, the claim that, in order to a be subject of moral rights, one must possess 
moral agency, must not be readily accepted. As Joel Feinberg has pointed out: “it is simply 
not true that the ability to understand what a right is and the ability to set legal machinery in 
motion by one’s own initiative are necessary for the possession of rights.” (2012: 373). This 
idea can be extended to cases that concern moral rights. It remains highly questionable 
whether the fact that nonpersons cannot have moral obligations must lead to the idea that 
persons do not have moral obligations towards theses nonpersons. It would be absurd to claim 
that newborns have no moral rights (and can therefore be used as mere means to our ends), 
only because they are incapable of moral agency. The newborn example leads us to an 
important insight, which is that personhood, in the way I have defined it, is “a fluctuating 
characteristic that varies not only across human beings, but also across times within a life.” 
(Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2011: 27). To hold that personhood is a prerequisite for having 
inviolable moral rights, would be to render the obtainment of such rights insecure for 
everyone, for everyone must go through stages in life in which he or she cannot be considered 
a rational being, capable of moral reflection.  
 It could be argued that, because persons (in this case human beings) are the only ones 
capable of acting on moral principles, they are also the only ones that can fulfill the task of 
protecting those nonpersons (in this case animals) that would benefit from such protection. 
However, to claim that animals would indeed benefit from moral protection, is to imply that 
they possess a certain value of their own that is deserving of such protection. In other words, 
in order to successfully make the case in favor of granting animals inviolable rights 
(effectively appealing against asymmetrical Kantianism), it must be shown that animals 
possess at least one morally relevant characteristic that obliges us to treat them as ends-in-
themselves. I will argue that the selfhood is such a characteristic.  
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4. Selfhood 
 
4.1 What is Selfhood? 
 
All those beings that have a subjective experience of, and believes and desires regarding, their 
own existence and of the world around them, can be said to be selves. In other words, they can 
be said to possess selfhood. We can equate the notion of selfhood with Regan’s similar, albeit 
more detailed, notion of subject-of-a-life. Subjects-of-a-life are those beings that “have beliefs 
and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including their own future; an 
emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; (…) the ability to initiate action in 
pursuit of their desires; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the 
sense that experiential life fares well or ill for them.” (2004: 243). As I will show, at least 
some (and arguably most) animals can be said to be selves. Because selfhood will lead to the 
possession of morally relevant interests, and, as I will show, the possession of such relevant 
interests is necessary for having moral rights, the notion of selfhood is of paramount 
importance in my argument in favor of animal rights.  
 
4.1.1 The Moral Significance of Preference Interests 
The notion of selfhood, as defined above, is intrinsically linked with interests. Without 
possessing selfhood, a being cannot possibly possess morally relevant interests. Seeing how, 
as I will now show, moral rights are derived from the possession of such interests, those 
beings that lack such interests, cannot be regarded as having moral rights. It might be useful 
to quickly zoom in on this relationship between selfhood, interests, and moral rights.  
Frey (1979: 234) distinguishes two types of interests. The first type, which I shall call 
welfare interests, concerns those things that are in one’s general interest, whether one desires 
those things or not. For example: ‘it is in Daniel’s  interest to eat healthy food (even though he 
hates eating it), because it will prevent him from falling ill’. The second type, which I shall 
call preference interests, concerns those things that one personally desires. These things may 
not always be in one’s welfare interest. For example: Daniel loves to eat unhealthy food and 
has spent the last three years living on a diet of cupcakes and lemonade. He currently weighs 
close to 180 kilos and is on the verge of becoming diabetic. Without a doubt, changing to a 
diet of vegetables and water (both of which he despises) would result in a considerable 
improvement of Daniel’s health, but at the same time it would entail a frustration of his 
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fondness for sweet stuff. Therefore, a change of diet would be in Daniel’s welfare interest, but 
certainly not in his preference interest.  
           But while it is true that one can have both welfare and preference interests, it is the 
possession of the latter that is needed for having moral rights. Frey convincingly illustrates 
this point, when he considers the interests of tractors. Tractors have welfare interests in the 
sense that their general state can either be better or worse; it would be better to take good care 
of a tractor, rather than to neglect it, because obviously, a well maintained tractor will perform 
better than a neglected tractor. At the same time it would be absurd to claim that tractors have 
preference interests. Tractors cannot personally desire to be taken care of. The welfare of the 
tractor is not in its own direct interest, rather it is in the interest of the farmer who wants to 
use it in his daily practices. It would be equally absurd to grant a tractor certain moral rights. 
In other words, although a tractor has a welfare, it does not have an experiential welfare; it 
cannot in itself experience the state it is in and therefore it cannot desire to either maintain or 
improve that state. Put differently, it cannot experience or form beliefs about its own 
existence, and therefore it cannot wish its existence to go better or worse for itself.  
           Considering the tractor example then, it seems that the possession of selfhood is 
necessary for having preference interests, and having preference interests is in turn necessary 
for having moral rights. After all, if one does not have preference interests, one cannot be 
harmed or benefitted in any morally relevant way.  Joel Feinberg makes this statement 
abundantly clear in his interest argument (Feinberg, 2012: 375):  
 
The Interest Argument  
 
1. A (moral) right holder must be capable of being represented (by itself or by an external 
advocate) and it is impossible to represent a being that has no (preference) interests. 
2. A (moral) right holder must be capable of being a beneficiary in his own person, and a 
being without (preference) interests is a being that is incapable of being harmed or 
benefitted, having no good or “sake” of its own.  
 
Once we accept the interest principle, it becomes clear why we are justified in denying 
inanimate entities and certain animate entities moral rights; they cannot be seen as possessing 
preference interests. Because a brain tumor has no preference interests, we can ignore its 
welfare interest (which would entail an undisrupted continuance of its growth), and proceed 
with its removal without feeling morally encumbered. This insight provides a clear answer to 
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those opponents of animal rights who claim that if we are to grant moral standing to animals, 
we should grant it to all living things. 
  
4.1.2 The Selfhood Argument 
By arguing that animals’ possession of selfhood should justify their possession of certain 
inviolable moral rights, I directly challenge the first premise of the personhood argument, 
which states that personhood is a prerequisite for having such rights. While I do not wish to 
deny that the possession of personhood is a sufficient requirement for having such rights, my 
claim regarding the moral relevance of selfhood suggests that it is not a necessary 
requirement. My argument concerning selfhood and moral rights can be outlined as follows: 
 
The Selfhood Argument 
 
1. The possession of selfhood is both a necessary and a sufficient requirement for having 
inviolable moral rights. 
2. Some animals possess selfhood.  
3. Therefore, some animals have inviolable moral rights.  
 
In what follows, I will first discuss the second premise of the selfhood argument and do away 
with the arguments of those who try to reject this premise. Then I will show how the 
possession of selfhood logically leads to having inviolable moral rights. 
 
4.2 Do Animals Possess Selfhood? 
 
Before turning to a discussion of the first premise of the selfhood argument, it needs to be 
established whether some animals can indeed be seen as possessing selfhood. After all, if no 
animal possesses selfhood, the selfhood argument would become utterly useless in my 
endeavor to show that animals should have inviolable moral rights. The idea that animals 
possess selfhood is not undisputed. I will discuss the debates regarding animals’ possession of  
consciousness, sentience, and beliefs and desires, and conclude that, seeing how we cannot 
deny that animals possess these traits, they should be seen as selves.  
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4.2.1 Consciousness 
A common denial of the idea that animals are selves and therefore have moral rights, is based 
on the thought that animals lack consciousness. Obviously, the possession of consciousness is 
necessary for the possession of selfhood as I have defined it. Those that deny that animals can 
have possess personhood because they lack consciousness make the following argument: 
 
 The Consciousness Argument 
 
1. Consciousness is a necessary requirement for the possession of selfhood. 
2. No animal possesses consciousness. 
3. Therefore, no animal possesses selfhood. 
 
The first premise of the consciousness argument immediately rules out the possibility 
of any inanimate entities possessing selfhood. It also excludes those animate entities about 
which scientific knowledge and research compels us to conclude that they cannot possibly 
possess consciousness (such as plants, brain cells, and bacteria) from the moral community. 
When it comes to animals, however, things become less obvious. For example: not many 
people are willing to deny that dogs are consciously experiencing the world around them. Just 
as small a number of people would argue that dogs do not feel pain or cannot experience 
emotions. However, within the animal rights debate, both ancient and contemporary 
philosophers have maintained such controversial views. I will now turn to their arguments and 
show how they can be refuted.  
 
The Cartesian View 
The 17th century French philosopher René Descartes is well known for his explicit denial of 
animal consciousness. According to him, animals are nothing more than ‘thoughtless brutes’ 
whose only value is instrumental in nature, in so far as they merely exist as means to the ends 
of mankind (Regan, 2004: 5). Descartes did not deny that animals are alive (after all, it would 
be absurd to deny that animals have beating hearts and functioning bodies), and neither did he 
claim that animals cannot have sensations. However, Descartes’ conception of sensation is 
crucial in this matter. He distinguishes three ‘grades’ of sensation: the first grade concerns 
“the immediate affection of the bodily organ by external objects; and this can be nothing more 
than the motion of the sensory organs and the change of figure and position due to that 
motion.”,  second grade sensations involve “the immediate mental results, due to the mind’s 
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union with the corporeal organ affected; such as the perceptions of pain, of pleasurable 
stimulation, of thirst, of hunger (and so on)”, and third grade sensations concern “all those 
judgments which, on the occasion of motions occurring in the corporeal organ, we have from 
our earliest years been accustomed to pass about things external to us.” (Regan, 2004: 3-4). 
According to Descartes, animals possess only first grade sensations. In other words, animal 
behavior is purely reflexive and requires nor  involves any level of consciousness; animals are 
automata.  
 This conviction is reflected in the work of Peter Carruthers. He claims that there are 
indeed “many experiences that don’t feel like anything.” (Carruthers, 1989: 258). These kinds 
of experiences, which he calls nonconscious experiences, can be illustrated at the hand of the 
following example: when walking through a crowded mall while texting a friend, a person 
will still be able to avoid bumping into the people around him. However, it cannot be said that 
this person consciously dodges his fellow shoppers, because he is entirely focused on the text 
he is sending. In other words: dodging his fellow shoppers ‘doesn’t feel like anything’.  
In order to be considered conscious, Carruthers claims that so-called second-order 
beliefs are required. Second-order beliefs reflect Descartes’ third grade of consciousness and 
can be described as ‘conscious beliefs relating to experiences’. This leads Carruthers to 
conclude that “a conscious experience is a state whose content is available to be consciously 
thought about.” (Carruthers, 1989: 763). Seeing how, according to Carruthers, not many 
people would be willing to ascribe second-order beliefs to animals, they cannot be said to be 
subject to conscious experience. As shown above, no entity that lacks consciousness can have 
an experiential welfare, and therefore no entity that lacks consciousness can have morally 
relevant interests. It follows that no such entity can have moral rights. According to this logic, 
Cartesians argue that animals do not have moral rights.  
 
The Language Argument 
The Cartesian view seems controversial, and it is surprising to see that contemporary 
philosophers such as Carruthers, and, as we shall see in what follows, Frey, use it to argue 
against the moral standing of animals. Nevertheless, if one wants to do a good job at 
defending moral rights for animals, the view needs to be disposed of in a convincing manner. 
That is what I shall now attempt to do. 
One major problem with the mechanistic view is that, if we consider animals not to be 
conscious, we do not seem to have any good reason for believing that the same wouldn’t go 
for other humans. I, as a human being, can only be completely certain of my own 
 26 
consciousness. There does not seem to be a way for me to conclusively determine whether my 
fellow humans are conscious too. How am I to know whether my neighbor’s behavior is not 
purely reflexive? Maybe his stretching out his arm to shake my hand is merely an ‘affection 
of his bodily organ by an external object (me, preparing to shake his hand)’. Descartes 
attempts to refute this objection in two ways. The first concerns a religious account of the 
immortality of the human soul, which I will not discuss here. The second is more relevant for 
my current endeavor, and involves the argument that linguistic capability is sufficient and 
exclusive proof of consciousness. The language argument is one of the most widely used 
arguments among those argue against the consciousness of animals.  
 Simply put, the argument states that in order to be able to master a language, one 
needs to possess the capacity for second-order beliefs. No value or meaning can be given to 
words, if such beliefs are not present. After all, where conscious experience is absent, it 
becomes impossible to make sense of linguistic stimuli and form appropriate linguistic 
responses to these stimuli. Therefore, one’s ability to speak a language is proof of one’s  
consciousness. Seeing how animals do not speak a language, they must also lack second-order 
beliefs and thus consciousness. The language argument against animal consciousness can be 
outlined as follows: 
  
The Language Argument 
 
1. Only those beings who can master a language are conscious.  
2. Animals cannot master a language. 
3. Therefore, animals are not conscious. 
 
Refuting the Language Argument 
The validity of the second premise of the language argument has been widely debated among 
scientists. It has been suggested that highly intelligent animals such as whales, dolphins, and 
the great apes, engage in communicative behavior that resembles the human use of language. 
However, I will not venture into these discussions here, because even if it were true that some 
animals have linguistic capabilities, it remains a fact that the majority of animals does not. 
Therefore, unless we are willing to accept that all those animals who are incapable of 
linguistic communicative behavior are not conscious beings, a refutation of the language 
argument needs to entail a demonstration of the falseness of the first premise.  
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 The most striking and questionable feature of the first premise is the fact that it is 
based on the ability to form second-order beliefs. In other words, one’s ability to learn a 
language (and thus one’s consciousness) is purely associated with one’s capacity to 
experience Descartes’ third grade sensations (‘all those judgments which, on the occasion of 
motions occurring in the corporeal organ, we have from our earliest years been accustomed to 
pass about things external to us’). The fact that animals are likely to lack second-order 
beliefs/third grade sensations and may therefore be incapable of mastering a language, does 
not show that they are not conscious. After all, we may still argue that they have second grade 
sensations (‘the immediate mental results, due to the mind’s union with the corporeal organ 
affected; such as the perceptions of pain, of pleasurable stimulation, of thirst, of hunger (and 
so on’). Put differently, the fact that animals may not be able to experience third grade 
sensations does not a priori justify foreclosing the possibility that they may have the capacity 
for second grade sensations Nonetheless, that is precisely what Descartes and Carruthers 
imply when they respectively argue that animals are merely reflexive beings, who lack any 
kind of conscious sensation whatsoever.  
Whatever justifications both thinkers have for their denial of animals’ capacity for 
second order sensations, they do not make them abundantly clear. And yet such justifications 
seem very much called for. As Regan notes: “from what we know about the relationship 
between human consciousness and the structure and function of the human nervous system, 
there is good reason to believe that our consciousness is intimately related to our physiology 
and anatomy.” (2004: 29). Seeing how some animals (at least all mammals) show significant 
similarities to humans when it comes to their ‘physiology and anatomy’, we have good 
reasons to assume that if humans can experience second grade sensations, so can animals. The 
burden of proof rests on those who claim that animals cannot have such sensations. This mean 
that both the language argument and the second premise of the consciousness argument must 
be rejected.  
 
4.2.2 Sentience 
It may be argued that even if animals are conscious, they may not be sentient, and that 
sentience is yet another prerequisite for having preference interests. There may be things to 
say in favor of the view that without sentience, a being cannot have preference interests. 
However, such arguments would not be relevant here, since I have shown that we have no 
good reason to deny that animals possess second order sensations. If second order sensations 
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involve the perception of certain physical impulses, this may just be another way of saying 
that second order sensations equal sentience. In this way, no being can be conscious and yet 
not be sentient. Objections that involve medical cases in which an individual loses his ability 
for  physical sensation while at the same time that person remains conscious, do not succeed 
in refuting this claim. If such an individual would be conscious, he would still be able to 
experience emotions, such as fear, sadness, or joy. If we consider these emotions to be 
physical reactions in the brain to external stimuli, they can be classified as second grade 
sensations. In other words, we have no reason to doubt that at least some animals (in so far as 
they show neurological similarities with humans) will still be sentient in the way that they can 
experience emotions, even in cases where the nervous system has stopped working.   
 
4.2.3 Beliefs and Desires 
I have now established that we have good reasons to assume that animals are conscious and 
sentient beings. In other words, they have an experiential welfare. However, it may be 
claimed that while an animal’s possession of consciousness and sentience ensures that it has 
an experiential welfare, it does not ensure that it has preference interests. For while it may be 
true that preference interests cannot exist without an experiential welfare, the presence of an 
experiential welfare does not a priori ensure the presence of preference interests.  
Frey acknowledges this fact when he claims that in addition to being conscious and 
sentient, beings must also possess the ability to form beliefs and desires in order to have 
preference interests. Frey argument can be outlined in the following way: 
 
The Beliefs and Desires Argument 
 
1. Experiential welfare is a necessary, but not a sufficient requirement for having 
preference interests. In addition, a being must possess the ability to form beliefs and 
desires. 
2. Animals may well have an experiential welfare, but they lack the ability to form 
beliefs and desires. 
3. Therefore, animals cannot have preference interests. 
 
Frey defends the second premise of the beliefs and desires argument by appealing to yet 
another language argument. Frey’s argument may be summarized as follows: 1.) preference 
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interests cannot exist in the absence of desires; 2.) desires cannot exist in the absence of 
beliefs; 3.) beliefs cannot exist in the absence of language. 4.) Therefore, preference interests 
cannot exit in the absence of language. 5.) seeing how animals do not master a language, they 
cannot have preference interests. 
 Frey claims that beliefs are really beliefs in the truth of a certain sentence. To 
illustrate: when a dog experiences pain in its tail, the discontinuance of that pain can only be 
in the dog’s interest if the dog desires such discontinuance. In order for the dog to desire this, 
it must believe that it has pain in its tail. According to Frey, such a belief must entail the belief 
that the sentence “I have pain in my tail” is true. This argument seems peculiar to say the 
least. Regan offers a convincing rejection of Frey’s theory. He shows that if Frey would be 
right in claiming that all beings that do not speak a language are therefore automatically 
incapable of forming beliefs about the world around them, human babies would never be able 
to learn a language (Regan, 2004: 45). After all, learning a language entails having certain 
beliefs. For example, learning the word ‘ashtray’, entails a belief in the truth of the sentence 
“this particular object (an ashtray) is called an ‘ashtray’”. Seeing how, according to Frey, pre-
linguistic beliefs are impossible, human babies can logically never learn a language. And yet 
they can, which implies that the mastering of a language is not a prerequisite for having 
beliefs (and therefore for having desires).  
Frey’s argument thus fails to show the validity of the second premise of the beliefs and 
desires argument. But it may rightfully be argued that by refuting Frey’s argument, I have not 
necessarily proven this second premise to be false. I claim, however, that we have good 
reasons to assume that animals do indeed possess the ability to form beliefs and desires. These 
reasons are based on the earlier reasoning concerning animal consciousness and sentience. 
Beliefs and desires are generated by perception and inference. Again, considering the 
physiological similarities between humans and some animals, we have no good reason to 
assume that those animals that are conscious are incapable of perception and inference. 
Stephen Stich (1979: 17) illustrates this point by stating that “if (a) canine’s master puts a 
meaty bone in (a) dog’s dish, if the dog has a clear view of the proceedings, if it is paying 
attention and is psychologically normal, then the dog will form the belief that there is a meaty 
bone in its dish.”. Consequently the dog will form the desire to devour this bone. Similarly, if 
an animal’s perception of pain is comparable to that of a human (as we have seen, we have no 
good reason to deny this), we have no good reason to assume that it does not have preference 
interests similar to those of humans, in situations in which pain is inflicted on it. The animal 
will either prefer the suffering to end, or it will prefer the suffering to continue (perhaps it 
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cherishes masochistic sentiments), but why would we assume that, even though it consciously 
experiences them, it is somehow indifferent to these sensations? Although it may be argued 
that we cannot know for sure if animals have the capability of forming beliefs, the burden of 
proof, again, rests on the shoulders of those who, like Frey, deny that they have this 
capability. 
 
4.2.4 Some Animals Possess Personhood 
I have shown that we have good reasons to claim that at least some animals are conscious and 
sentient (and thus have an experiential welfare) and are capable forming beliefs and desires 
about themselves and the external world. It logically follows that they can be seen as selves. 
Therefore, the second premise of the selfhood argument has successfully been defended. 
Before I continue, one obvious dilemma needs to be addressed. This dilemma concerns the 
question which animals should be seen as possessing selfhood. 
 
4. 3 Where to Draw the Line? 
 
Which animals can be seen as selves? In other words, which animals meet the minimum 
requirements of consciousness, sentience and the capacity to form beliefs and desires? 
Intuitively, most of us are ready to acknowledge that cats meet these criteria (some even argue 
that cats (and other species) possess distinct personal characters), and as shown above, 
physiological similarities between such species and ourselves, seem to confirm these 
convictions, and put the burden of proof on those who argue otherwise.  
However, we are less willing to grant the abovementioned characteristics to animals 
such as ants or flies. We are mostly reluctant to do so because we do not relate to such 
species. Put differently, we cannot possibly even begin to imagine what it must be like for 
such an animal to exist. However, the fact that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a 
certain being should not at forehand lead us to deny that this being may possess selfhood. In 
his seminal article ‘What Is It Like To Be A Bat?’, Thomas Nagel addresses this issue. He 
stresses the subjective character of experience. He claims that from the fact that we, as human 
beings, cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat, it does not follow that bats therefore do not 
have an experiential welfare: “If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is 
something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a 
thing to be the case remains a mystery.” (Nagel, 1975: 445-446). Nagel’s arguments are 
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useful to keep in mind, and will prevent us from overeagerly excluding certain species from 
our moral community. However, they do not conclusively resolve (and indeed, perhaps only 
exacerbate) the dilemma concerning the ascription of selfhood. 
 Two principles can be useful in guiding us through this dilemma. The first can be 
called the principle of similarity; it entails the idea that we have enough reason to claim that at 
least those animals that show sufficient physiological similarities to the human species, should 
be seen as conscious, sentient, and having beliefs and desires. This means that at least all 
mammals (note that the bat in Nagel’s example is indeed a mammal) should be acknowledged 
as possessing selfhood. The principle implies that the less similarities a species shows with 
the human species, the less reason we have to claim that they are like us in morally relevant 
ways. For example, we would have good reasons to deny preference interest to those animals 
with no or low brain capacity (judged by the amount of neurons these animals possess) such 
as sponges, jellyfish, and leeches. However, in the case of birds, the matter becomes le clear-
cut. This brings us to the second principle, namely the principle of the benefit of the doubt. As 
the name implies, this principle states that in those cases in which we are not certain whether 
to ascribe preference interests to animals, we should treat those animals as if they did have 
such interests. Regan (2003: 37; 2004: 30) states that both mammals of one year and older, 
and birds, should be seen as having moral rights. I agree with Regan and claim that (again, for 
physiological reasons) we have good reasons to ascribe selfhood to these kinds of animals.  
 
4.4 Selfhood and Moral Rights 
 
Now that I have established that mammals and birds (henceforth I will refer to them as animal 
selves) should be seen as possessing selfhood, it needs to be made clear why this should lead 
to their eligibility for moral rights.  
 
4.4.1 The Inherent Value of Beings That Matter to Themselves 
I have already shown that selfhood is required in order to have preference interests, and that 
the possession of preference interests is a necessary requirement for having moral rights. 
Implicit in these ideas is the notion that those beings that possess personhood, matter to 
themselves. To clarify, individuals who possess personhood necessarily matter to themselves, 
for they personally benefit from those things that facilitate the satisfaction of their preference 
interests, and personally suffer from those things that frustrate the satisfaction of their 
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preference interests. In other words, selves are consciously aware of their existence and 
benefit from, or be harmed by, the fact that their lives can either go better or worse for them. 
 In her discussion of the relationship between Kantian ethics and animals, Korsgaard 
makes a helpful distinction between two slightly different Kantian concepts of end-in-itself-
ship. The first is the concept of an end-in-itself as the source of legitimate normative claims. 
The second is the concept of an end-in-itself as someone who can give the force of law to his 
claims by participation of moral legislation (Korsgaard, 2004: 21). We have seen that animals 
are not persons and can therefore never be ends-in-themselves in the sense of the second 
conceptualization. However, I argue that they are ends-in-themselves in the sense of the first 
conceptualization. This argument is based on two main convictions: 1.) the moral legislation 
that is formed by persons is partly based on their desire to protect their selfhood (after all, 
persons are, just like animal selves, beings that matter to themselves and thus have an interest 
in protecting their personal welfare). This means that what these persons aim to protect when 
they engage in moral legislation processes, is not just their personhood, but also their 
selfhood. 2.) if persons value their selfhood, it would be morally arbitrary for them to exclude 
those beings that possess selfhood in a similar way from the moral community, purely on the 
basis of the fact that those beings are not persons. Korsgaard has summarized this argument in 
the following way: “The strange fate of being an organic system that matters to itself is one 
that we (humans/persons) share with the other animals. In taking ourselves to be ends-in-
ourselves, we legislate that the natural good of a creature who matters to itself is the source of 
normative claims. Animal nature is an end-in-itself, because our own legislation makes it so.” 
(2004: 33). Simply put, it is the fact that beings can matter to themselves, and not their 
capacity for rationality, that should form the basis of viewing those beings as constituting 
ends-in-themselves. The fact that they are ends-in-themselves makes that animal selves 
should receive moral rights. 
  
4.4.2 Respecting Rational Nature in the Abstract 
Another way of attacking the Kantian idea that only persons can be ends-in-themselves 
because only persons possess rational nature, is set forth by Allen Wood. In order to fully 
understand Woods reasoning, we need to revisit Kant’s above mentioned formula of humanity 
as end in itself. As we have seen, this principle implies that, “rational nature has a moral claim 
on us only in the person of a being who actually possesses it.” (Wood, 1998: 6). Wood calls 
this the personification principle. He argues against this principle and claims that if we are to 
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acknowledge the exclusive value of rational nature, we must not only cherish it to the extent 
in which it is possessed by persons, but we should also respect it in the abstract. Doing so 
would entail respecting fragments of it, even if these fragments are found in (non-rational) 
animal selves. Among these fragments are those traits that are related to selfhood, such as the 
capacity to experience pleasure and pain, the capacity to have desires for such things as food, 
drink and sex, and the possession of preference interests. As Wood states, such desires are 
“the infrastructure of our own rational nature as regards survival, nourishment and 
reproduction. If respect for the rational nature served by this natural teleology requires that it 
not be thwarted or frustrated, then once we are free of the restrictions of the personification 
principle it seems reasonable to extend this argument and claim that respect for rational nature 
requires similar constraints regarding the natural teleology in non-rational living things.” 
(1998: 16). 
 The fact that animals possess fragments of rationality “allows us to value (..) (them 
and) their welfare for its own sake (Wood, 1998: 18). Wood, however, refuses to infer from 
this that animal selves should have moral rights. His position can thus not be seen as a 
successful refutation of asymmetrical Kantianism. It should be clear that I do not agree with 
Wood when he states that the view he defends falls short of showing that animals have rights. 
As I have shown above, the fact that, according to Wood, we should value animal selves’ 
welfare for its own sake seems reason enough to grant them the right to be treated as ends-in-
themselves. I may be considered a Woodian then, in so far as I agree with his claims about the 
moral relevance of what he calls the fragments of rationality that can be found in animal 
selves. However, Wood and I part ways when he states that he does not know how to decide 
“when the welfare of non-rational beings should prevail over the ends and interests of rational 
beings.” (Wood, 1998: 18). After all, as I have claimed, animal welfare, or personhood, 
should be seen as worthy of moral protection.  
 
4.4.3 Marginal Cases 
A final way of showing how the possession of selfhood should lead to the granting of moral 
rights, concerns so-called marginal cases. Seeing how animal selves and human persons share 
important physiological traits and seeing how both possess personhood, the difference 
between them seems to be one of degree rather than of kind. The only thing that seems to 
distinguish persons from selves is the fact that they possess a higher degree of intelligence and 
are therefore rational. However, the fact that not all humans are moral persons, and can, 
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therefore, according to a Kantian view, not be considered as constituting ends-in-themselves, 
poses a difficulty for those proponents of asymmetrical Kantianism, because few people are 
willing to deny human non-persons moral rights. If it is true that some animals are more 
intelligent than some humans (and this clearly is the case; consider for example the difference 
in intelligence between a healthy, adult orangutan and a mentally handicapped human child), 
and if it is true that the difference between animals and human beings is one of degree, and 
not of kind, it would surely be morally arbitrary to grant human nonpersons a more favorable 
moral position than their animal counterparts.  
It seems therefore that proponents of asymmetrical Kantianism face two options. They 
will either have to; 1. accept that if human non-persons may not be treated as mere means, 
then neither may animal selves, or; 2. ‘bite the bullet’ and accept that if animal selves may be 
treated as mere means, then the same should go for human non-persons. My arguments about 
the moral relevance of selfhood logically lead me to adopt the first option. However the 
animal rights literature is replete with attempts to justify unequal treatment of animal selves 
and human non-persons. I will turn to these attempts shortly. First, let us see which moral 
rights can be derived from the possession of selfhood. 
 
5. Animal Rights 
 
Now that I have shown that animal selves are eligible for moral rights, it must be made clear  
what kind of moral rights these should be. Of paramount importance for understanding the 
kind of moral rights that should be ascribed to them is the above mentioned idea that animal 
selves should be seen as constituting ends-in-themselves, or, as Regan (2004: 235) has 
phrased it; they as possessing inherent value. Inherent value is independent of, and not 
reducible to, the values of these beings’ experiences (as utilitarianism would have it), but is 
fully derived from the animal’s selfhood. Whichever term one may prefer, the conclusion that 
must be drawn from this insight is that animal selves should at least be granted certain 
inviolable moral rights, including the right not to be treated as mere means. This idea has been 
set forth in Regan’s The Case for Animal Rights (2004). In his discussion of the respect 
principle, Regan states that “we are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways 
that respect their inherent value.” (2004: 248). From the respect principle, Regan derives the 
harm principle, which entails that we have a prima facie duty not to inflict harm on those 
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beings that possess inherent value. Seeing how I, like Regan, have argued that the inherent 
value of selves is of direct moral importance, I am more than willing to accept both the 
respect principle and the harm principle. 
 The contrast between the extended Kantian notion that claims that animal selves have 
certain inviolable rights and the preference utilitarian idea that animals are fully violable in 
order to bring about maximal utility, could not be greater. It must therefore be stressed that, 
while some of the arguments that I have mentioned in order to show that animals should have 
moral rights (such as the fact that they conscious and sentient) are also used by preference 
utilitarians, my conclusion (namely that animal selves have the right to be treated as ends-in-
themselves) radically differs from the conclusion that these preference utilitarians draw 
(namely that animals have the right to the equal consideration of their like interests).  
 The realization that animal selves possess inherent value provides us with a powerful 
tool in our case against asymmetrical Kantianism. After all, if animal selves should be seen as 
having the moral right not to be treated as mere means, asymmetrical Kantianism, for it denies 
animals such rights, while granting them to human beings, must be seen as morally 
inconsistent. We are then justified in rejecting utilitarianism for animals and arguing in favor 
of an extended Kantianism. 
 
6. Membership of the Species Homo Sapiens 
 
I have argued that selfhood is both a necessary and sufficient requirement for having moral 
rights. By making the case for the moral sufficiency of selfhood, I have refuted the idea that 
personhood is a necessary requirement for having such rights. However, there are those 
proponents of asymmetrical Kantianism that accept this refutation, but nonetheless argue that 
animals should not have moral rights. They claim that in order to be eligible for moral rights, 
an individual must, additionally to possessing selfhood, enjoy membership of the human 
species. By basing themselves on the idea that selfhood is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
requirement for having moral rights, these theorists justify the unequal treatment of animal 
selves and human non-persons.  
The case in favor of privileging what I have called human marginal cases over animals 
is typically made on the basis of one out of two arguments. The first I shall call the kind 
argument. It entails the idea that human moral patients should receive moral standing purely 
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on the basis of their membership of the species Homo Sapiens. The second I shall call the 
sentimental argument. It draws on the idea that we have sentiment-based obligations towards 
human non-persons that we don’t have towards animal selves.  
 
6.1 The Kind Argument 
 
The kind argument is set forth by Carl Cohen (1986; 1997). According to Cohen, animals are 
logically excluded from the moral community because moral rights are an essentially human 
construction. He states that “rights are universally human; they arise in a human moral world, 
in a moral sphere. In the human world moral judgments are pervasive; it is the fact that all 
human including infants and the senile are members of that moral community-not the fact that 
as individuals they have or do not have certain special capacities, or merits-that makes 
humans bearers of rights.” (Cohen, 1997: 97). In other words, moral rights are an ‘issue of 
kind’ (Cohen, 1986: 866). Carruthers (1992: 7) utters a similar view when he states that all 
human beings, and no animals have moral standing. This view is arguably the most speciesist 
of all arguments in defense of the marginal case dilemma. Cohen acknowledges this and 
considers it to be a good thing, for, so he claims, those who are not speciesist are likely to 
forget their true obligations (namely, those they have regarding their fellow humans).  
 Cohen’s justifications for the kind argument are unsatisfactory. The assumption that 
kind is an appropriate threshold for moral standing is nothing more than that: an assumption. 
And a morally arbitrary one at that. What Cohen does is assigning property by association; 
namely assigning moral standing to human moral patients because they are of the human kind, 
and not because of their intellectual capabilities. This is arbitrary because Cohen at the same 
time argues that moral rights only exist in virtue of human moral agency/personhood. 
Furthermore, if we were indeed justified in assigning rights to moral patients on the basis of 
the kind they belong to, this would generate serious problems. As Nathan Nobis (2004) 
rightfully points out, ‘kind’ is a complicated concept and it is difficult to decide to which kind 
a being belongs. For example, do women belong to the same kind as men? Surely they deviate 
from men in several crucial ways.  
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6.2 The Sentimental Argument 
 
The sentimental argument concerns the idea that we as humans feel more attached to 
members of our own species. As Warren (1987) states, humans ‘care for other humans’, no 
matter whether they possess personhood or not. This caring sentiment towards our fellow 
Homo Sapiens can be explained in multiple ways. Warren suggests that it is easier for us to 
place ourselves in the position of others when these others are of the same species. This 
sentiment is enhanced when we realize that all of us have been non-persons at one point in our 
lives (in our infancy) and may be non-persons again one day (when we are old or as the result 
of medical misfortune). This ‘it-could-be-me-sentiment’ is also highlighted by Steinbock 
(1978). It also relates to the often heard claim that human moral patients should enjoy a 
privileged standing because they possess the potential for moral agency; unlike harming an 
animal, it would be wrong to harm a child because it is likely to grow up to be a moral agent. 
Additionally, she claims that we have special obligations towards human moral patients 
because they cannot, unlike their animal counterparts, sufficiently see to their own sustenance. 
For example, a wild boar is perfectly capable of sustaining itself, while a senile human being 
may not be. Furthermore, Steinbock states that we should move away from reflection on 
‘morally relevant differences’ between humans and animals, and into ‘the realm of feeling 
and sentiment in moral thinking’. This would lead us to adopt a view that privileges human 
moral patients over animal moral patients.  
 There are multiple ways to counter the sentimental argument. The most obvious way 
would be to argue that humans can indeed experience strong emotional attachment to animals. 
It may be argued, for example, that an old lady, living alone with her cat, could feel similar 
sentiments towards her cat as she would towards a near relative. Granted, if the lady had to 
choose between saving the life of her cat and saving the life of a human child, she would most 
likely choose to save the child, but that doesn’t mean that the off-hand rejection of our 
sentimental capabilities towards animals should be readily adopted.  
The notion that it would be easier for us to place ourselves in the positions of human 
moral patients rather than those of animal moral patients is also not without its problems. It 
remains highly questionable whether a healthy human being is more capable of imagining 
what it is like to be a severely retarded human being than it is of imagining what is like to be a 
dolphin.  
Furthermore, the potentiality of moral agency shouldn’t carry too much moral weight 
either. First of all, if this idea were to be accepted, it would still rule out all those human 
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beings that were born with a severe mental handicap and who have no chance of ever 
recovering from their illness. Second, the idea that potentiality should count for something is 
in itself questionable. The discussion around this subject is enormous, and I will not have the 
opportunity to go into it here (the abortion debate, to name but one, is a highly relevant 
example of a discussion that concerns the potentiality debate). However, to say that a baby 
should have the rights of a moral agent is implying that it is in fact a moral agent. This would 
be as absurd as stating that a caterpillar is in fact a butterfly. Another way of refuting the 
validity of the potentiality argument is by embracing it and showing that the argument should 
also apply to animals. If we assume that Darwinism is correct, then we have no good reason to 
deny the possibility that certain species (such as the great apes for example) have the potential 
to, in time, evolve into more developed creatures. If this is true, and we adopt the potentiality 
principle, we have no more less reason to grant moral standing to animals than to human 
babies. To this view, it may be objected that in the evolutionary case of animals, we are 
concerned with the potentiality of a species and not that of an individual. Seeing how only 
individuals can have rights, the potentiality argument does not apply to this case. However, if 
we were to kill a human infant, we do not only kill the potentiality of that particular 
individual, but also that of the individuals that the baby might have produced later in its life. 
This idea can be extended over as many generations as one would like to. Killing a gorilla 
therefore, similarly constitutes killing the potentiality of its potentially higher developed 
descendants. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Steinbock’s claim in favor of a move 
towards feeling and sentiment in our moral thinking seems to run counter to the essence of 
ethics; namely, the eradication of arbitrariness in moral reflection. Stating that we should act 
on gut-feeling is to do away with ethic’s central goal of inhibiting favoritism. 
In sum, there seems to be no morally arbitrary way to argue for the exclusion of 
animal non-persons from our moral community while refusing to do the same when it 
concerns  human non-persons. As I have argued above, as long as both groups of non-persons 
can be said to possess selfhood, both groups should have the moral right to be treated as an 
ends-in-themselves.  
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7. Conclusion: Dismissing Asymmetrical Kantianism 
 
I have attempted to show that the asymmetrical Kantian notion of ‘utilitarianism for animals, 
Kantianism for people’ constitutes an unsatisfactory approach to animal rights by showing 
that 1.) Kantianism should be preferred over utilitarianism because it provides certain crucial 
moral rights, such as the right not to be treated as a means to an end, whereas utilitarianism 
cannot, and 2.) because some animals possess morally relevant characteristics, it would be 
morally inconsistent to deny these crucial moral rights to animals, while at the same time 
granting them to human beings. 
 I have showed that proponents of asymmetrical Kantianism base their ideas on the 
assumption that the possession of personhood is a necessary requirement for having moral 
rights. I have agreed with them that animals cannot be seen as persons, but have opposed their 
conviction that only persons are eligible to moral protection. I have argued that the possession 
of selfhood should be seen as a sufficient requirement for having moral rights. I have shown 
that at least all mammals and birds can be said to possess selfhood (because they are, amongst 
other things, conscious, sentient, and capable of forming beliefs and desires), which entails 
the idea that they have a subjective experience of their own lives. Because they have this 
subjective experience (or what I have called experiential welfare), it follows that their lives 
can either go better or worse for them. This, in turn, has lead me to conclude that they should 
be seen as beings who matter to- and in themselves. For this reason, animal selves must be 
considered to possess a certain inherent value that is worthy of moral protection. Because 
selfhood is a morally relevant characteristic that animal selves possess to a similar extent as 
persons do, and seeing how human moral legislation is at least partly motivated by the 
recognition of the moral value of selfhood, we have no arbitrary reason not to extend moral 
rights to animal selves. Implicit in this reasoning is the notion that the difference between 
animals and human beings is on of degree (of intelligence), rather than of kind. This notion 
has rendered the idea that membership of the species Homo Sapiens constitutes a necessary 
requirement for the obtainment of moral rights invalid. 
 The realization that animal selves possess inherent value in a similar way as humans 
do, has massive implications for the validity of the asymmetrical Kantian view. As we have 
seen, asymmetrical Kantianism allows for the treatment of animals as means to (non)human 
ends. If animal selves possess inherent value, such a view becomes untenable. Instead, 
animals should be seen as constituting ends-in-themselves, which logically results in the 
conclusion that they should have the inviolable moral right to be treated as such. This idea has 
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lead me to adopt Regan’s  respect- and harm principles which dictate that we have a prima 
facie duty not to harm beings that are ends-in-themselves.  
 Adoption of the respect principle and the harm principle would result in a radical shift 
in our current treatment of animals. Abolitionist animal rights theorists have argued that we 
are obliged to discontinue such practices as eating meat, medicinal experimentation, 
vivisection, etc. and they are right in stating that adoption of symmetrical Kantianism forces 
us to. However, I am fully aware of the discrepancy between theoretical deliberations and real 
world practices. It may be very difficult for modern day human beings to envision a life 
without those practices which are so deeply entrenched in our societies, and it may be even 
more difficult to actually realize their abolition. Nonetheless, at the very least, my account 
against asymmetrical Kantianism should lead the reader to adopt a more considerate view 
towards our treatment of animals. 
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